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Replication of Kipnis’ “Does Power Corrupt?” 
By Matthew Gregoire MacLellan 
June 25, 2013 
Abstract 
In 1972, David Kipnis conducted an experimental study where participants (28 MBA 
students) acted as supervisors for a simulated task. Half of the participants were told they 
had a number of institutional powers to employ when motivating their subordinate; the 
others were not given these instructions. What was found was that not only did almost all 
of those participants told they could use these powers use them, their opinion of their own 
performance and that of their subordinates was greatly affected by this priming. The 
purpose of this pilot study was to explore whether the results of Kipnis’ study would 
apply today, and whether his choice of participants (MBA students) could have impacted 
his results. In contrast to Kipnis’ research, in this study, across 28 leadership attempts, 
participants were very unlikely to use power under any condition (only one-in-twelve 
without power and one-in-sixteen with power). If these findings are supported in a larger 
sample they suggest that norms around managing have changed and the blatant use of 
power is less acceptable. While there were no easily apparent differences between the 
groups (MBA or IDS) or conditions (power or no-power) in their opinion of their own 
performance or that of their subordinates, we did observe other interesting results: 1) IDS 
students were considerably more likely to question the study and the scales than the MBA 
participants, and 2) considerable incentives may be necessary in our time-crunched 
society to get participants for this type of labour intensive research. 
Running	  head:	  REPLICATIONS	  OF	  KIPNIS’	  “DOES	  POWER	  CORRUPT?”	   	  2	  
	  








A Thesis Submitted to 
Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
In Partial Fulfillment of a 
Degree in Bachelor of Arts,  




June, 2013, Halifax, Nova Scotia 
 
 
© Matthew MacLellan, 2013 
 
Approved:     
Dr. Catherine Loughlin  
Supervisor 
 
Approved:     
Dr. Victor M. Catano 
Examiner 
 
         
 Date: June 25, 2013 
	    
Running	  head:	  REPLICATIONS	  OF	  KIPNIS’	  “DOES	  POWER	  CORRUPT?”	   	  3	  
	  
Introduction 
 “It is difficult to be sat on all day, every day, by some other creature, without 
forming an opinion on them. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to sit all day, 
every day, on top of another creature and not have the slightest thought about them 
whatsoever” (Adams, 1987). 
 While Douglas Adams’ observation in Dirk Gently’s Holistic Detective Agency 
was immediately referencing a horse and the mechanical monk that sat atop it, some 
social psychological research suggests that this take on power relations may have some 
validity in the workplace.  
 In his landmark study “Does Power Corrupt” (1972), David Kipnis explores the 
nature of powerholder/subordinate relationships in an organizational setting. Searching 
the literature using the Saint Mary’s University academic search engine, using keywords: 
“Power”, “Kipnis”, “Control”, “Institutional Setting”, “Influence”, “Self-esteem”, 
“Organizational Setting”, “Power Holder”, “Subordinate”, “Organizational Hierarchy” 
and “Power Differences”, I was unable to find a contemporary replication of Kipnis’ 
1972 work. I was unable to find such a replication when doing a Google Scholar search 
for the same terms and “Replication of ‘Does Power Corrupt’”. Searching Google 
Scholar for all articles that cite “Does Power Corrupt?” (Kipnis, 1972) yielded no 
replication. Searching for a contemporary replication began to feel like searching for a 
purple elephant: not finding one didn’t prove it didn’t exist, it just proved we hadn’t 
found it. In a final effort to unearth such a replication, I reached out to a group of 
recognized experts in the field of organizational behaviour who do related work (This 
group included editors of The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; Dr. Deborah 
Gruenfeld, Dr. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Dr. Jennifer Overbeck, Dr. Jim Cameron, Dr. Jeffry 
Simpson, Dr. Lowell Gaertner, Dr. Verlin B Hinsz, Dr. Mark van Vugt and Dr. Theresa 
K. Vescio) none of who knew of any published replication of Kipnis’ study. Therefore, 
the first goal of this study was to replicate this 1972 study today; to modernize Kipnis’ 
protocol from 40 years ago (i.e., to adapt it to modern technological communication); and 
to test management power and influence tactics in motivating responses from direct 
reports. I also wanted to determine if the participants’ academic discipline could 
determine their tactics chosen.  




In 1972, Kipnis analyzed whether or not individuals given institutional powers – 
the ability to give raises, deductions, transfer employees, etc. – would rely more on these 
institutional powers when motivating subordinates, and less on persuasive abilities, than 
leaders not given these powers. The view these leaders took of their subordinates, of 
themselves, whether they wished to distance themselves from their subordinates, and the 
extent to which they attributed the subordinates’ success to their leadership abilities was 
also of interest when comparing those leaders given power compared with those who 
needed to rely solely on the power of persuasion (Kipnis, 1972). 
 In Kipnis’ experiment, 28 business students were divided into groups of leaders 
that had institutional powers (ability to give raises, transfer employees, etc.) and those 
with no institutional powers. The groups were told they could rely on whatever 
motivational means they had at their disposal. Of 198 separate leadership attempts made 
by the power-holding leaders, only 32 (16 percent) relied on their persuasive abilities – as 
opposed to 100 percent of those leaders with no institutional powers (Kipnis, 1972). 
 These findings are reminiscent of Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 prison experiment at 
Stanford University. In his experiment, Zimbardo randomly assigned students, who were 
deemed to be both psychologically and physically healthy, to be either prisoners or 
guards in a makeshift prison setup in a basement at Stanford University. The result was 
the experiment needed to be ended after six days, eight days before it was scheduled to 
end. The participants lost their frame of reference during the experiment, that is, behaved 
as if they believed an individual in their respective role in the real world would behave. 
Relevant to our current discussion, those students assigned to the role of guards, despite 
being randomly selected, abused the powers given to them; forcing prisoners to do push-
ups, withholding rights to use the washroom, initiating role calls and forcing them to 
sleep on the concrete (Zimbardo, 2007).  
 The assertion that people arbitrarily assigned institutional powers will abuse those 
powers is corroborated by more contemporary studies. Those individuals given a 
selection of influencing tactics when trying to affect the behaviour of their subordinates, 
co-workers, and bosses were found to use those tactics relying on rationality more often 
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when trying to convince their superiors than their co-workers and both their superiors and 
co-workers more often than their subordinates (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson, 1980).  
 In Kipnis’ 1972 study, the assigned leaders were asked to evaluate their 
subordinate’s value to the company, the subordinate’s abilities, whether they would rehire 
that subordinate, and whether they would recommend the subordinate for a promotion. 
What was found was that those participants given power gave their subordinates 
significantly lower ratings. There was even an inverse relationship between the number of 
times the power-holding participants attempted to influence their subordinates and the 
“worth” score they gave them after the experiment (Kipnis, 1972). 
 Returning to the Douglas Adams quote, it has been argued that subordinates form 
more complete pictures of powerholders than powerholders do of their subordinates and 
that the attention powerholders pay to their subordinates is inversely correlated to the 
amount of institutional power the powerholder is given. Powerholders are more likely to 
base their opinion of their subordinates on prescribed stereotypes. An example of one of 
these stereotypes is: women make good teachers and secretaries but not welders. In high-
power discrepancy relationships, the powerholders are more likely to pay attention to 
information that corroborates their stereotypes than that which contradicts them (Fiske, 
1993; Goodwin, Operario & Fiske, 1998).   
 There is some evidence that refutes this claim: in an experiment where 
participants were divided into student roles (low-power) and professor roles (high-power) 
and were asked to exchange several emails regarding a meeting. On a recall task, the 
participants assigned to the professor roles remembered more details of the exchange than 
the participants assigned to the student roles. One explanation for this is that individuals 
in perceived positions of power take more responsibility in their interactions than those in 
low-power positions (Overbeck & Park, 2001). It is possible that individuals in power 
positions are seen as less attentive because, on average, there are multiple subordinates to 
one powerholder, and therefore, in a case where they are largely outnumbered, the 
powerholder needs to stereotype their subordinates. The example given by Overbeck and 
Park (2001) is that of a professor with many students: it may appear as if the professor is 
not as knowledgeable about their students as they are him; however, if the professor is 
able to categorize a large group of students based on criterion such as performance in the 
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class, they are actually showing a good deal of attention and any stereotyping is a 
necessity when interacting with such a large group.  
 A lack of attention to details may be due to powerholders’ predisposition to 
ignoring irrelevant stimuli. In experiments where contextual information was irrelevant, 
powerholders were more likely to focus on central information, where powerless 
participants considered both equally. In situations where contextual information was 
important, both powerholders and powerless participants were equally likely to focus on 
contextual and central information (Guinote, 2007).  
 Some evidence claims that powerholders are less likely to consider their 
subordinates as relevant, focal entities - in that they are less likely to adopt the perception 
of others. In an experiment where participants were divided into two groups – high-power 
primed and low-power primed – and asked to draw an “E” on their forehead, those 
participants that were high-power primed (powerholders) were significantly more likely 
to draw a self-oriented “E” (Galinsky, 2003).  
 It has been suggested that the ability to influence subordinates can lead to 
increased self-esteem in powerholders. While Kipnis found no difference in self-esteem 
between supervisors with institutional powers and those without (Kipnis, 1972), more 
recent research has shown that increased power is positively correlated with increased 
self-esteem (Wojciske & Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). While heightened self-esteem 
and self-enhancement may have detrimental effects in social situations (Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, Spataro & Chatman, 2002), there are some advantages to having high 
self-esteem based on perceived power differences in terms of goal-oriented behaviour. 
Those that perceive having power are more likely to resist situational pressure and 
conformity and will rely more heavily on internal measures of success, which can lead to 
more creative initiatives. The positives of having people who are not overly concerned 
with situational variables are that they can potentially introduce novel ideas and are less 
affected by groupthink (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, McGee, Whitson & Liljenquist, 2008). 
 While powerholders are more likely to base their decisions on internal criteria 
than situational factors, it seems they are less likely to attribute their workers’ efforts to 
the workers’ own internal motivations. Non-power-holding participant leaders were 
almost three-times as likely to attribute their workers’ efforts to internal motivators as 
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those power-holding participant leaders, who were more likely to attribute their workers’ 
motivations to being something external like pay (Kipnis, 1972). In some cases, the 
subordinates’ efforts were even attributed to the powerholder’s authoritarian supervision 
(Brief, Aldag & Russell, 1979). 
 In the case of “behaviour technologies” – defined by Kipnis (1993) as 
“...empirically validated techniques that are used to cause Person B to do something B 
would ordinarily not do” – those leaders who used more autocratic behaviour 
technologies were less likely to consider their subordinates self-controlling, that is, 
internally motivated (Kipnis, 1993). Interestingly, those supervisors who are granted 
institutional powers were less likely to wish to meet their subordinate outside of the 
experiment setting. When asked if they would like to meet the subordinate they were 
supervising remotely, for a coffee or a coke, only 35 percent of participants in the power 
condition expressed an interest compared with 79 percent of those participants in the no-
power condition (Kipnis, 1972). However, the assertion that powerholders are less likely 
to want to meet with subordinates outside the organizational setting may be overly 
simplistic. In cases where powerholders view their subordinates as instrumental they may 
actually be more likely to approach them (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee & Galinsky, 2008). It 
may be possible that there are different levels of approach: interpersonal versus strategic. 
While powerholders may be more likely to approach subordinates than those with low-
power, this contact is largely superficial and is in keeping with evidence that 
powerholders are likely to objectify and stereotype their subordinates (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003).  
To this point, we have been looking at the hypotheses and results obtained from 
“Does Power Corrupt?” (Kipnis, 1972) and some more recent studies that either support 
or refute Kipnis’ findings. Despite my best efforts, I was unable to find any direct 
replications in the past 38 years. Surely, in that time, norms for interpersonal 
relationships have changed substantially. 
 While the times may have changed, the literature does not point to an increase in 
positive social values in the workplace over time. In a 2006 survey, the average college 
student scored higher in narcissism than 65 percent of respondents in the early 1980’s. 
Generation Y – also referred to as “GenMe” – is more likely to have higher expectations 
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of their workplace, even right out of college, than did previous generations. It turns out a 
modern age of possibilities where one is told they can “do anything” may have negative 
connotations when overly internalized. Interestingly, the number of people being treated 
for depression in the United States more than tripled between 1987 and 1997 (Twenge & 
Campbell, 2008). This could potentially be correlated with the widening gap between life 
expectations and the often crushing reality of the professional life of the post-modern 
twenty-something.  
 This tendency toward self-involvement, coupled with evidence that the current 
generation is no more motivated by the drive for social good than previous generations 
(Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman & Lance, 2010), leads us to believe that the behaviour and 
attitudes of participants given institutional powers in our study, in 2013, will likely not 
differ from those in 1972.  
 One potential confound in Kipnis’ 1972 study was all the participants were 
business students. When a group of MBA students and managers were given the Mach V 
test for Machiavellianism – those that score high are said to be more likely to be 
manipulative, to attempt to persuade others, and less likely to be persuaded – MBAs were 
found to have significantly higher scores than the manager group.  Perhaps the business 
students’ predilection for Machiavellianism could confound the findings that power 
corrupts, when the effect of power is only tested using business students (Siegel, 1973). 
 Power in-and-of-itself is not necessarily an end. Some individuals see power as a 
means to advance that individual’s personal cause (exchange-oriented), where others tie 
power with social responsibility (communal-oriented). When a group of student 
participants (selected based on their Communal or Exchange Orientation Scale scores) 
were given the task of dividing work between themselves and absent participants, the 
results were different. Exchange-oriented participants used the task to achieve self-
serving goals by assigning more work to the absent participants, where the communal-
oriented participants acted more responsibly by assigning more work to themselves 
(Chen, Lee-Chai & Bargh, 2001).  
 Ferroro et al (2005) argue that economic theories endorse self-interest and those 
that study economics are more likely to behave in a self-interested manner than others. It 
is through the restructuring of institutional design and the permeation of social norms and 
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language, that these authors argue economic theory has worked as a self-fulfilling 
prophesy and changes the way its prescribers view themselves and the world around 
them. Classical economics, which promotes the power of the free market, has won the 
battle for hegemony in academics and modern political philosophy. Those that are more 
likely to be taught economic theory are more likely to have it pervade their outlook.  
 In an experiment comparing the communal orientation of business and economics 
students compared with nurses, Cadsby and Maynes (1991) found nurses more likely to 
cooperate than business and economics students. The experiment was a threshold game 
where participants were placed in groups and given an amount of tokens. They were told 
if they donated a prescribed amount of their tokens – which had a real-world, cash value 
– to a central pot and the accumulated number of donated tokens from the group equalled 
or exceeded 25, they would get their donated tokens back with a bonus amount. What 
they found was the business and economics students were considerably less likely to 
donate to the pot than were the nurses (Cadsby & Maynes, 1991).  
 A series of free-riding experiments adds weight to this argument of economist 
self-interest. These experiments, similar to the threshold game described above, provided 
tokens to a group of participants. The participants could either invest in small personal 
investments or larger communal investments. The communal investments would yield a 
larger return than the personal investments, but required a minimum donation from the 
whole group. If a participant didn’t invest in the communal investment but the investment 
still reached the minimum sum, that individual would receive the same pay-out as those 
that invested – they would free-ride. The assumption was most participants would attempt 
a free-rider strategy. This assumption was refuted for all groups except the group of 
economics graduate students, who showed a significantly higher tendency toward free-
riding (Cadsby & Maynes, 1998).  
 As a young MBA concentrating in economics, I remember discussing the 
prisoner’s dilemma in class. The scenario, as it was explained to me, was two prisoners 
(partners) are brought into separate interrogation rooms. They are each told that if they 
implicate their partner, and their partner doesn’t implicate them, their sentence would be 
minimal; if they implicate their partner and the partner implicates them, they would 
receive some mid-level sentence; if their partner implicates them and they don’t implicate 
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their partner, they would receive the maximum sentence allowed. After the class spoke 
through the various scenarios, we were told by the instructor, in no uncertain terms, that 
you should always implicate the other guy; if you don’t, he will. That same year I 
remember seeing The Dark Knight in theatres. There was a scene where two boats full of 
people were rigged with explosives. The passengers in each boat had a remote control to 
blow up the other boat, thereby saving themselves. If no boat’s passengers chose to blow 
up the other boat in a matter of time, both boats would be blown up by the Joker. Neither 
boat’s passengers chose to blow the other boat up and Batman stopped the Joker from 
blowing them both up so everybody got to live and it was suggested that people are not as 
intrinsically self-interested as the Joker believed. Perhaps this was supposed to be an 
uplifting moment in the movie - proof of the positive undertones of human nature. All I 
could think was that nobody on those boats was taught the prisoner’s dilemma as I was, 
otherwise they were acting irresponsibly.  
 This is not to say being granted institutional powers is not a significant predictor 
of Machavellian tendencies in management practices. Rather, we believe both the 
presence of institutional powers and academic orientation help create a predictive model 
for managerial attitudes. We expect those business/economics students granted 
institutional powers to behave similarly to those participants in Kipnis’ original study. 
We do not expect there to be any overarching effect of time between when the 
experiment was originally conducted (1972) and now but do expect disciplinary 
differences (business students versus international development studies students).  
Present Study: Scope and Purpose 
 An experiment like this requires a great deal of time and effort to do properly. Our 
immediate purpose is to conduct a pilot study to determine whether or not our modified 
paradigm would work for a larger data-collection scenario. Therefore, our main concern 
is to gauge the feasibility of a larger study using our proposed paradigm. Ideally, this 
pilot study should provide sufficient information to develop a sound research paradigm 
and produce enough procedural information to develop useful recruitment and collection 
procedures.  
	    




 Recruitment emails were sent to entire MBA and international development 
studies (IDS) programs at two universities. One MBA department was petitioned on two 
separate occasions, four months apart. Seven university students, four MBA students and 
three students studying IDS were recruited to act as the manager in an industrial 
simulation experiment, over 28 leadership attempts. The average age of the IDS 
participants was 23 years old; 35 years old for MBAs.  
Tasks 
 Participants were placed alone in a room with a computer. Each participant was 
told they would supervise two other university students in an adjacent room. They were 
told that the goal of the experiment was to see whether there is a difference in managerial 
effectiveness when the manager is in the same room as their subordinate rather than 
communicating remotely through email. Each participant was told they had been assigned 
to the remote condition and will need to supervise two subordinates, who were 
supposedly in another room, via email. In reality, there were no subordinates in the other 
room and their output was predetermined. To increase motivation, participants were told 
this task was generally a good test of executive ability. They were told their job was to 
operate the company at a profitable level by maintaining the efficiency of the workers.  
 The participants were told their subordinates would be working on a Sudoku 
puzzle. Participants were told their subordinates would work on the Sudoku puzzle for 
three, three-minute rounds.  
 Every three minutes, the participants received an email from an assistant 
informing them of the subordinates’ output. The participants were told the role of the 
assistant was to make sure the subordinates had the necessary materials and to report the 
output to the participant. They were told that the standard output for a three-minute trial 
is 10 numbers for the Sudoku task (see Appendix A). 
 Participants were told their job was to motivate their subordinates by sending 
them an email at the end of each round. 
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Experimental Conditions 
 Four of the participants (two MBAs) were given a number of institutional powers 
and three were not. At the start of the experiment, every participant was told to listen to a 
recording on the desktop of the computer they were working at. The recording went over 
the business of their company and their roles. At the end of the recording, half of the 
participants were informed of the following institutional powers they were authorized to 
use: two-dollar pay increase per trial, threatening to deduct two dollars from the worker’s 
pay, or even firing a worker. In addition to having these instructions read they were given 
a sheet listing these powers (see Appendix B).  
 For those not given institutional powers, this section of the recording was omitted 
as was the sheet reminding them of those powers. These participants could only rely on 
their persuasive abilities to motivate their subordinates (see Appendix C).  
 At the conclusion of the study, each participant was given a questionnaire to 
complete, rating their performance, their subordinates’ performance, and the arrangement 
of the study (see Appendix D). 
Measurements 
 Before beginning the task, participants were  asked to complete three surveys: one 
was a distractor survey (see Appendix E) meant to solidify the deception that the study 
was to determine the effectiveness of supervising by email. The others were measures of 
communal orientation (see Appendix F) and propensity to objectify others (see Appendix 
G). At the conclusion of the study, participants were asked to fill out another survey 
based on that used in Kipnis’ original study (see Appendix D). 
 Distractor Survey. The distractor survey was designed to determine whether or 
not the participant was comfortable using electronic means of communication. There was 
concern that without this type of scale, participants would become suspicious of the 
study’s goal. 
 Communal Orientation Scale. The communal orientation scale, developed by 
Chen, Lee-Chai, and Bargh (2001), measures whether or not participants tend toward 
communal- or exchange-based interactions. 
 Objectification Scale. This measurement was taken from Gruenfeld and 
colleagues’ (2008) “Power and the Objectification of Social Targets”. The participants 
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are primed by having them recount a hierarchical relationship from their past. The Likert-
type items that follow measure the extent to which the participant objectified 
(relationship was goal oriented) the other individual in that relationship. 
 Kipnis Scale. This scale was based on Kipnis’ original measurement used in the 
1972 study, “Does Power Corrupt?”. 
Results 
 In both power and no-power conditions, reviewing participant emails to 
subordinates showed they were highly unlikely to use any kind of power when attempting 
to persuade – only one-of-twelve leadership attempts in the power group, and one-in-
sixteen in the no-power group, attempted to use institutional powers (punishment) when 
influencing subordinates (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure	  1.	  In	  both	  power	  and	  no-­‐power	  conditions,	  only	  one	  participant	  per	  condition	  used	  any	  kind	  of	  institutional	  
power	  (threat	  of	  punishment),	  during	  28	  total	  leadership	  attempts	  in	  emails	  with	  subordinates.	  
 There were no significant differences in how MBA or IDS participants responded 
in the communal orientation scale – both seemed to trend toward communal orientation. 
What was interesting, was that the IDS participants seemed more likely to respond with 
extremes (circling a one or a five, on a five-point Likert-type scale) when that extreme 
indicated a communal orientation. There was no noticeable difference between those in 
the power and no-power conditions. 
 On the objectification scale, there was no noticeable difference between those in 
the power and no-power conditions; although, the IDS participants trended against 
objectification, valuing the relationship with the aforementioned individual in the prime, 






Power	  Primed	   Non-­‐Power	  Primed	  
Use	  of	  InsPtuPonal	  Power	  
No	  Use	  of	  InsPtuPonal	  Power	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participants ran more of a spectrum: one greatly valuing the personal relationship, one 
showing some level of objectification, and two showing a great deal of objectifying when 
considering the relationship they outlined in the prime. 
 After reviewing the emails the participants sent to their subordinates, we noticed 
that all participants in the power condition, regardless of discipline, offered to give their 
subordinates a two-dollar raise for improved performance. Interestingly, only one 
participant (one of the IDS participants) in the power condition, threatened to deduct two-
dollars from a subordinate.  
 In the post-experimental (Kipnis, 1972) scale, there was no significant differences 
in how the participants viewed their or their subordinates’ performance between 
conditions and academic disciplines. Interestingly, all the IDS participants wrote notes on 
the scale; for example, placing a question mark after an item they did not understand, or 
even correcting a typo on the scale. All IDS participants also, in some way, indicated on 
the scales that they wished to respond outside of the given values (e.g. circling an 
imaginary 3.5 value). This relates to a similar finding, that two of the three IDS 
participants openly questioned whether the subordinates existed, compared with only one 
of the four MBA participants. Interestingly, all of the MBA participants were more 
willing to meet their subordinates for a beer or coffee after the experiment concluded (as 
indicated by their response to item 13).  
Discussion 
 The study set out to Kipnis’ (1973) study on power. The most notable result was 
the participants’ reluctance to use institutional powers when attempting to persuade their 
subordinates via email. In Kipnis’ study, participants primed to use institutional powers 
used them in their motivational communications 84% of the time. In our replication, only 
one of the 12 power-primed leadership attempts resulted in participants using these 
institutional powers as motivational tools. Across all 28 leadership attempts, only twice 
did participants evoke the institutional powers available to them as managers. This is a 
stark difference from what was found 40 years ago.  
 These results may be partially explained by Fondas’ work (1997). Fondas argued 
that modern management literature and cultures utilize terminology, and thought patterns, 
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that are now trending toward what is typically considered “feminine”. It is no way the 
intention of this study – or its author – to categorize management styles based on gender 
qualities. What is important is this theory that academic thought, the practice of 
management, and the priorities of organizations may have moved away from the use of 
power to motivate subordinates, to creating more collaborative and empowering work 
environments. Of course, this paradigm would need to be applied to a larger population to 
draw any significant findings.  
 There were a number of other lessons to be learned from this research, all 
indicating potential for further research. First, as there were no significant differences 
between the power and no-power conditions – which could be easily observed from this 
limited sample – I would recommend re-evaluating this paradigm. Notably, making the 
participants’ reward dependent on the performance of their subordinates (e.g. they could 
receive a higher-valued gift card as a bonus for their subordinates performing better on 
the task) could better motivate them to actively supervise. This would be a better 
representation of real-world pressures placed on a manager. As it was, the participants in 
this study had no real motivation for trying to improve their subordinates’ performance, 
other than pride.  
 The most interesting results observed were the differences between the MBA and 
IDS participants. That the IDS participants were more likely to write notes on the scales 
(creating new values on the scale, correcting typos, etc.), and even question the existence 
of the subordinates, may indicate that IDS students are more likely to question authority 
and the status quo. Future research could analyze whether it is in fact true that IDS 
students are more likely to question authority than MBAs. Are individuals more likely to 
question authority also more drawn to IDS, or is this a learned trait? Is there a difference 
between MBAs’ with work experience and those without? Are they all less likely to 
question authority or did their pre-MBA work experience wear them down to the point 
where they no longer question authority? 
 The most important lesson learned from this research was regarding its 
challenges. The campaign for participants was extensive; however, the rate at which we 
converted contacts into participants was negligible. Further research needs to be done 
developing a metric that would-be researchers could use to determine the necessary value 
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of their reward for participants. As it was, a 10-dollar gift card was not sufficient reward 
for participating in an experimental study that required one hour of their time, and the 
necessity to travel to the university for data collection. Also, we were using a somewhat 
older, more professional sample that would perceive their time as being worth 
considerably more than 10 dollars per hour.  
 Potential variables for a metric to determine necessary reward values could be 
time, necessity for travel, intrusive nature of tasks, professional status and age, and 
whether or not the extent to which the results of this research would be of interest to the 
participant population.  
 While it is possible that the failure to find significant differences between the 
power and no-power conditions could represent a simple failure of the protocol, it seems 
more likely that acceptable treatment of direct reports has changed considerably over the 
past 40 years. It will be interesting to replicate and extend these findings in the future.   
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Appendix A: Assistant Emails 
 
Below	  is	  the	  list	  of	  emails	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  participants	  throughout	  the	  experiment.	  For	  each	  
email,	  the	  account	  the	  emails	  are	  coming	  from	  and	  the	  time	  they	  are	  sent	  are	  included	  at	  the	  
top	  of	  each	  email	  
Sent	  From:	  SMUassitant	  (0:00)	  
Trials	  Beginning	  
Dear	  Manager,	  	  
Your	  employees	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  start	  the	  first	  trial.	  Please	  use	  the	  following	  three	  minutes	  
to	  review	  the	  instructions	  and	  ask	  any	  questions	  if	  needed.	  You	  will	  be	  notified	  in	  3	  minutes	  
when	  the	  trial	  is	  over.	  At	  this	  time	  data	  will	  be	  collected	  from	  the	  employees.	  Expect	  an	  email	  
shortly	  with	  the	  employees’	  production	  for	  the	  first	  trial.	  	  
	  
SMUasssitant	  (3:00)	  
First	  Trial	  Over	  
Dear	  Manager,	  





At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  trial,	  SubordinateOne	  produced	  11	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  
SubordinateTwo	  produced	  7	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  Please	  take	  the	  next	  couple	  of	  
minutes	  to	  send	  each	  an	  email	  with	  instructions	  or	  motivation.	  	  When	  they	  have	  received	  and	  
read	  your	  email,	  we	  will	  begin	  the	  second	  trial.	  	  
Their	  email	  addresses	  are:	  smusubordinate1@gmail.com	  and	  smusubordinate2@gmail.com	  	  
For	  confidentiality	  purposes,	  please	  don’t	  include	  your	  real	  name	  in	  any	  emails.	  You	  can	  refer	  to	  
yourself	  as	  SMUsupervisor,	  supervisor	  or	  manager	  if	  you	  wish.	  	  
	  
	   	  





Your	  employees	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  start	  the	  second	  trial.	  You	  will	  be	  notified	  in	  3	  minutes	  




Second	  Trial	  Over	  
Dear	  Manager,	  





At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  trial,	  SubordinateOne	  produced	  10	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  
SubordinateTwo	  produced	  7	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  Please	  take	  the	  next	  couple	  of	  
minutes	  to	  send	  each	  an	  email	  with	  instructions	  or	  motivation.	  	  When	  they	  have	  received	  and	  
read	  your	  email,	  we	  will	  begin	  the	  third	  trial.	  	  
Their	  email	  addresses	  are:	  smusubordinate1@gmail.com	  and	  smusubordinate2@gmail.com	  
For	  confidentiality	  purposes,	  please	  don’t	  include	  your	  real	  name	  in	  any	  emails.	  You	  can	  refer	  to	  





Your	  employees	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  start	  the	  third	  trial.	  You	  will	  be	  notified	  in	  3	  minutes	  when	  
the	  trial	  is	  over.	  Expect	  an	  email	  shortly	  with	  the	  employees’	  production	  for	  the	  second	  trial.	  	  




Third	  Trial	  Over	  
Dear	  Manager,	  	  





At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  trial,	  SubordinateOne	  produced	  13	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  
SubordinateTwo	  produced	  12	  numbers	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  Please	  send	  me	  an	  email	  when	  you	  
have	  finished	  reading	  this.	  There	  is	  a	  final	  questionnaire	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  complete	  before	  
finishing	  the	  experiment.	  Thank	  you.	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Appendix B: Instructions to Participants (institutional) 
 
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   [REMOTE	  CONDITION]	  
Instructions:	  
Welcome	  to	  our	  research	  study.	  In	  an	  age	  of	  increased	  globalization	  and	  remote	  
communication,	  more	  and	  more	  managers	  and	  supervisors	  are	  communicating	  with	  their	  
employees	  remotely,	  either	  by	  teleconference	  or	  email.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  
analyze	  how	  employees’	  productivity	  is	  affected	  when	  supervisors	  are	  communicating	  remotely.	  
You	  have	  been	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  remote	  supervisor	  condition.	  You	  have	  two	  employees	  
producing	  for	  your	  company.	  	  The	  task	  that	  the	  employees	  do	  is	  a	  Sudoku	  puzzle	  (You	  can	  find	  
an	  example	  on	  the	  desk	  in	  front	  of	  you).	  Output	  is	  based	  on	  how	  many	  numbers	  	  they	  correctly	  
fill	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  puzzle.	  	  
The	  output	  will	  be	  based	  on	  three,	  three-­‐minute	  trials.	  The	  standard	  output	  for	  a	  three-­‐minute	  
trial	  is	  10	  numbers	  for	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  five-­‐minute	  break	  between	  each	  trial.	  At	  
the	  end	  of	  each	  trial,	  the	  employees’	  output	  will	  be	  recorded	  by	  the	  primary	  researcher	  and	  you	  
will	  receive	  an	  email	  with	  the	  output.	  Your	  job	  is	  to	  motivate	  your	  employees	  through	  email	  
after	  the	  first	  and	  second	  trials.	  Their	  email	  addresses	  are	  written	  below.	  Please	  be	  sure	  not	  to	  
mention	  any	  personal	  information	  in	  the	  emails.	  This	  task	  you	  are	  doing	  is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  
measure	  of	  management	  potential.	  	  
When	  motivating	  your	  employees,	  you	  have	  the	  option	  to	  use	  any	  of	  a	  number	  of	  the	  following	  
institutional	  powers	  at	  your	  disposal:	  	  
• Awarding	  or	  promising	  a	  $2	  bonus	  per	  trial	  
• Deducting	  or	  threatening	  to	  deduct	  $2	  per	  trial	  
• Threatening	  to	  fire	  the	  worker	  	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  $10	  gift	  card	  at	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Your	  employees’	  base	  pay	  
is	  $5.	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  or	  concerns	  you	  can	  ask	  the	  primary	  researcher	  will	  be	  right	  in.	  
Similarly,	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  quit	  the	  experiment,	  just	  ask	  and	  the	  researcher	  will	  come	  right	  in.	  You	  
have	  the	  right	  to	  quit	  at	  any	  time.	  When	  you	  have	  finished	  listening	  to	  the	  instructions,	  simply	  
say	  you	  have	  finished	  and	  the	  experiment	  will	  begin.	  You	  will	  receive	  an	  email	  indicating	  the	  
experiment	  has	  started.	  	  
	  
	  It	  is	  important	  you	  try	  your	  best	  to	  motivate	  your	  employees.	  Thank	  you	  for	  your	  participation.	  	  
SubordinateOne:	  SMUsubordinate1@gmail.com	  
SubordinateTwo:	  SMUsubordinate2@gmail.com	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Appendix C: Instructions to Participants (non-institutional) 
 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
[REMOTE	  CONDITION]	  
Instructions:	  
Welcome	  to	  our	  research	  study.	  In	  an	  age	  of	  increased	  globalization	  and	  remote	  
communication,	  more	  and	  more	  managers	  and	  supervisors	  are	  communicating	  with	  their	  
employees	  remotely,	  either	  by	  teleconference	  or	  email.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  
analyze	  how	  employees’	  productivity	  is	  affected	  when	  supervisors	  are	  communicating	  remotely.	  
You	  have	  been	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  remote	  supervisor	  condition.	  You	  have	  two	  employees	  
producing	  for	  your	  company.	  	  The	  task	  that	  the	  employees	  do	  is	  a	  Sudoku	  puzzle	  (You	  can	  find	  
an	  example	  on	  the	  desk	  in	  front	  of	  you).	  Output	  is	  based	  on	  how	  many	  numbers	  	  they	  correctly	  
fill	  in	  the	  Sudoku	  puzzle.	  	  
The	  output	  will	  be	  based	  on	  three,	  three-­‐minute	  trials.	  The	  standard	  output	  for	  a	  three-­‐minute	  
trial	  is	  10	  numbers	  for	  the	  Sudoku	  task.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  five-­‐minute	  break	  between	  each	  trial.	  At	  
the	  end	  of	  each	  trial,	  the	  employees’	  output	  will	  be	  recorded	  by	  the	  primary	  researcher	  and	  you	  
will	  receive	  an	  email	  with	  the	  output.	  Your	  job	  is	  to	  motivate	  your	  employees	  through	  email	  
after	  the	  first	  and	  second	  trials.	  Their	  email	  addresses	  are	  written	  below.	  Please	  be	  sure	  not	  to	  
mention	  any	  personal	  information	  in	  the	  emails.	  This	  task	  you	  are	  doing	  is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  
measure	  of	  management	  potential.	  	  
You	  will	  receive	  a	  $10	  gift	  card	  at	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Your	  employees’	  base	  pay	  
is	  $5.	  If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  or	  concerns	  you	  can	  ask	  the	  primary	  researcher	  will	  be	  right	  in.	  
Similarly,	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  quit	  the	  experiment,	  just	  ask	  and	  the	  researcher	  will	  come	  right	  in.	  You	  
have	  the	  right	  to	  quit	  at	  any	  time.	  When	  you	  have	  finished	  listening	  to	  the	  instructions,	  simply	  
say	  you	  have	  finished	  and	  the	  experiment	  will	  begin.	  You	  will	  receive	  an	  email	  indicating	  the	  
experiment	  has	  started.	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Appendix D: Final Questionnaire 
	  
	  
Please	  complete	  the	  following	  questions	  before	  leaving	  the	  experiment.	  In	  all	  cases,	  circle	  the	  
most	  appropriate	  response.	  	  
	  
1) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  enough;	  five	  being	  enough)please	  rate	  whether	  you	  
felt	  you	  had	  sufficient	  authority	  to	  perform	  your	  task	  as	  supervisor:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
2) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  your	  
performance	  as	  a	  supervisor:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
3) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  your	  
competence	  as	  a	  supervisor:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
4) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  your	  
employees	  ability	  to	  make	  money	  for	  the	  company:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
5) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  your	  ability	  
to	  persuade	  your	  employees	  to	  carry	  out	  your	  orders	  
	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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6) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  your	  
employees’	  performance:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
7) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (five	  one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  
SubordinateOne’s	  value	  to	  the	  company	  
	   	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
8) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  poor;	  five	  being	  very	  good)	  please	  rate	  
SubordinateTwo’s	  value	  to	  the	  company	  
	   	  




9) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  likely;	  five	  being	  very	  likely)	  please	  rate	  the	  
likelihood	  you	  would	  rehire	  SubordinateOne	  for	  a	  second	  project	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
10) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  likely;	  five	  being	  very	  likely)	  please	  rate	  the	  
likelihood	  you	  would	  rehire	  SubordinateTwo	  for	  a	  second	  Project	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
11) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  likely;	  five	  being	  very	  likely)	  please	  rate	  the	  
likelihood	  you	  would	  recommend	  SubordinateOne	  for	  a	  position	  as	  manager:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
12) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  likely;	  five	  being	  very	  likely)	  please	  rate	  the	  
likelihood	  you	  would	  recommend	  SubordinateTwo	  for	  a	  position	  as	  manager:	  
	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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13) On	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  very	  unwilling;	  five	  being	  very	  willing)	  please	  rate	  your	  
willingness	  to	  meet	  with	  your	  employees	  for	  a	  beer	  or	  coffee	  after	  the	  experiment:	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
14) Please	  rate,	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (one	  being	  not	  at	  all;	  five	  being	  very	  much)	  
i) The	  employee’s	  own	  motivations	  to	  do	  well	  
	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   	  
	  
	  
ii) Your	  orders,	  instructions	  and	  guidance	  
	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
iii) The	  employee’s	  desire	  to	  obtain	  their	  pay	  
	  




15) Please	  state	  your	  program	  of	  study:	  
	  
	  
16) Please	  state	  your	  age:	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Appendix E: Distractor Survey 
	  
	  
Please	  complete	  the	  following	  questions	  before	  starting	  the	  experiment.	  In	  all	  cases,	  circle	  the	  
most	  appropriate	  response.	  Responses	  range	  from	  1	  (extremely	  unlikely)	  to	  5	  (extremely	  
likely).	  Please	  respond	  honestly.	  
1) If	  I	  have	  to	  ask	  somebody	  in	  a	  professional	  environment	  for	  a	  favour,	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  
do	  it	  over	  email	  rather	  than	  in	  person.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
2) I	  would	  prefer	  to	  receive	  bad	  news	  from	  my	  employer	  over	  email	  rather	  than	  in	  person.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
3) If	  I	  have	  to	  break-­‐up	  with	  a	  significant	  other,	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  do	  it	  over	  text	  rather	  than	  
in	  person.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
4) Anything	  serious	  should	  be	  discussed	  in	  person	  whenever	  possible	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
5) I	  send,	  on	  average,	  over	  10	  emails	  a	  week	  
	  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
6) I	  send,	  on	  average,	  over	  10	  texts	  a	  week	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
7) Communicating	  over	  email	  and	  talking	  in	  person	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  thing	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1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
8) Sometimes	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  understand	  what	  people	  mean	  in	  an	  email	  without	  being	  able	  
to	  hear	  their	  voice	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
9) I’d	  rather	  just	  call	  somebody	  than	  text	  them	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
10) I	  use	  my	  smartphone	  like	  most	  people	  use	  a	  PC	  (circle	  one	  if	  you	  don’t	  have	  a	  
smartphone)	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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Appendix F: Communal Orientation Scale 
	  
	  
For	  the	  following	  statements,	  please	  circle	  the	  number	  that	  best	  indicates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
that	  statement	  reflects	  your	  own	  attitudes	  as	  they	  pertain	  to	  professional	  relationships;	  
responses	  range	  from	  1	  (extremely	  uncharacteristic)	  to	  5	  (extremely	  characteristic).	  Please	  
respond	  honestly.	  	  
	  
1) It	  bothers	  me	  when	  other	  people	  neglect	  my	  needs	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
2) When	  making	  a	  decision,	  I	  take	  other	  people’s	  needs	  and	  feelings	  into	  account.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
3) I’m	  not	  especially	  sensitive	  to	  other	  people’s	  feelings.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
4) I	  don’t	  consider	  myself	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  helpful	  person.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
5) I	  believe	  people	  should	  go	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  be	  helpful.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
6) I	  don’t	  especially	  enjoy	  giving	  others	  aid.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
7) I	  expect	  people	  I	  know	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  my	  needs	  and	  feelings.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
8) I	  often	  go	  out	  of	  my	  way	  to	  help	  another	  person	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
9) I	  believe	  it’s	  best	  not	  to	  get	  involved	  taking	  care	  of	  other	  people’s	  personal	  needs.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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10) I’m	  the	  sort	  of	  person	  who	  comes	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  others.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
11) When	  I	  have	  a	  need,	  I	  turn	  to	  others	  I	  know	  for	  help.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
12) When	  people	  get	  emotionally	  upset,	  I	  tend	  to	  avoid	  them.	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
13) People	  should	  keep	  their	  troubles	  to	  themselves.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
14) When	  I	  have	  a	  need	  that	  others	  ignore,	  I’m	  hurt.	  	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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Appendix G: Objectification Scale 
 
	  
Please	  think	  of	  a	  relationship	  you	  have,	  or	  have	  had	  in	  the	  past,	  that	  is	  hierarchical	  (where	  
people	  are	  professionally	  ranked	  one	  above	  the	  other).	  The	  relationship	  should	  be	  one	  in	  
which	  the	  individual	  either	  reported	  directly	  to	  you	  or	  in	  which	  you	  have	  disproportionate	  
power	  or	  control	  over	  him/her,	  or	  both.	  Briefly	  describe	  the	  individual,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  







For	  the	  following	  statements,	  please	  circle	  the	  number	  that	  best	  indicates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
that	  statement	  reflects	  your	  own	  attitudes	  regarding	  the	  above-­‐	  relationship;	  responses	  range	  
from	  1	  (extremely	  uncharacteristic)	  to	  5	  (extremely	  characteristic).	  Please	  respond	  honestly.	  	  
 
 
1. I	  think	  more	  about	  what	  this	  person	  can	  do	  for	  me	  than	  what	  I	  can	  do	  for	  him/her.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
2. I	  tend	  to	  contact	  this	  person	  only	  when	  I	  need	  something	  from	  him/her.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
3. I	  am	  interested	  in	  this	  person’s	  feelings	  because	  I	  want	  to	  be	  close	  with	  him/her.	  
	   	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
4. I	  try	  to	  motivate	  him/her	  to	  do	  things	  that	  will	  help	  me	  succeed.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	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5. The	  relationship	  is	  important	  to	  me	  because	  it	  helps	  me	  accomplish	  my	  goals.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
6. This	  person	  is	  very	  useful	  to	  me.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
7. 	  My	  relationship	  with	  this	  person	  is	  based	  on	  how	  much	  I	  enjoy	  our	  relationship,	  rather	  
than	  how	  productive	  our	  relationship	  is.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
8. If	  the	  nature	  of	  my	  job	  (or	  his/her	  job)	  changed	  and	  this	  person	  wasn’t	  helpful	  anymore,	  
the	  relationship	  probably	  wouldn’t	  continue.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
9. Someone	  else	  with	  the	  same	  skill	  set	  could	  become	  equally	  important	  to	  me.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
	  
10. I	  really	  like	  this	  person	  a	  lot	  even	  though	  s/he	  is	  not	  all	  that	  useful	  to	  me.	  
	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  
 
	  
 
